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Abstract
Television, music videos, films, and pop bands are all part of  global popular 
culture and thought to be the product of  “the west”. These media are therefore 
often seen as a threat to the identities of  nationalities, local cultures, and 
religious groups. In contrast, in the context of  Indonesian Muslims, the 
Indonesian Ulama Council’s (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) showed 
support for Fatin Shidqia Lubis to the singing contest of  Indonesian X Factor, 
2013. This paper intends to study the presence of  Fatin Sidqiah as the winner 
of  Indonesian X Factor and the response of  Indonesian muslims regarding 
Islamic popular culture in Indonesia. This paper argues that the presence of  
Islamic popular culture in Indonesia through books, novels, films, as well as 
fashion, show that Indonesian Islam and muslims are compatible not only with 
democracy but also with global popular culture. In addition, the presence of  
Fatin is a symbol of  young Indonesian muslims who already connect globally. 
Whatever they consume in terms of  popular culture is intrinsic to the creation 
of  their hybrid identities, as both Indonesian muslims and global citizens.
[Televisi, musik, film, dan bands merupakan bagian dari budaya popular 
dunia dan selalu dipandang sebagai produk “barat”. Karenanya, media ini 
sering dianggap sebagai ancaman bagi identitas nasional, budaya lokal, dan 
kelompok agama. Namun, dalam konteks keindonesiaan, Majelis Ulama 
1 I thank to Ibnu Nadzir, a Researcher at Social Culture Research Center, 
Indonesian Institute of  Science, for his critical point and useful discussion during this 
paper writing.   
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Indonesia (MUI) memberikan dukungan kepada Fatin Sidqia Lubis dalam 
kompetisi menyanyi “Indonesian X Factor” Tahun 2013. Tulisan ini mencoba 
menelisik kemunculan Fatin sebagai pemenang “Indonesian X Factor” dan 
tanggapan masyarakat mengenai budaya pop Islam di Indonesia. Melalui 
artikel ini penulis berpendapat bahwa kehadiran budaya pop di Indonesia 
dalam berbagai buku, novel, film, serta pakaian menunjukkan bahwa Islam 
dan masyarakat Islam di Indonesia tidak hanya sejalan dengan demokrasi, 
tetapi juga dengan budaya pop dunia. Lebih dari itu, Fatin adalah simbol 
muslim muda Indonesia yang telah terhubung dengan dunia. Apa pun yang 
mereka nikmati dalam hal budaya pop telah menciptakan identitas ganda: 
sebagai muslim Indonesia sekaligus sebagai warga dunia.]
Keywords: Fatin Shidqia, MUI, popular culture, the Indonesian X Factor, 
pop media
A. Introduction 
Although Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim nation, definition 
of  Islamic identity as a pious Muslim, who practices pure and Islamic 
values comprehensively in accordance with the source of  Alquran and 
Hadiths is still contested and unfinished. Unsurprisingly, a battle between 
Islamisation versus localization of  Islamic values within Indonesian 
culture and its secular state ideology often emerges in the Indonesian 
public sphere, especially in relation to events related to the notion of  a 
sense of  Indonesian Muslim brotherhood. According to Heryanto,2 there 
are two factors related to why this emerges, these are mainly internal 
and external. Internally, the advent of  both Hinduism and Buddhism in 
Indonesia prior to Islam encouraged Indonesian Muslims, especially on 
Java, to adopt a syncretic approach to their religious practices. Surely, 
these religious practices have created tension for ‘modernist groups’, 
of  which many are conservative, in order to purify Islam from both 
local belief  systems and cultural practices. On the other hand, there is a 
‘traditionalist group’ in Indonesian Muslim society who insist on keeping 
their local culture together, with Islamic principles as a part of  their 
tradition. On the external level, there is the colonial legacy, inherited by 
the New Order regime to enforce a secular-oriented daily life through the 
2 Ariel Heryanto (ed.), “Pop Culture and Competing Identities”, in Popular 
Culture in Indonesia: Fluid Identities in Post-Authoritarian Politics (London: Routledge, Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2008), pp. 74–5.
353Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014 M/1435 H
Fatin Sidqiah and Islamic Pop Culture
implementation of  Pancasila as the sole Indonesian ideology. In addition 
to both Abdurahman Wahid and Nurcholish Majid’s contributions in 
delegitimizing Islam as the sole Indonesian ideology and the preference 
of  Pancasila during the Suharto presidency, there are other factors in the 
struggle of  Islamisation that have emerged in the post-Suharto period.3 
One event in the ideological battle was the emergence of  Inul 
Daratista, a popular music singer (dangdut) from East Java, who in 2003 
became a sensation with her performance of  the ‘drill dance’ (goyang ngebor). 
Inul became the focus of  public debate. For many Muslim conservative 
groups, Inul’s attire was seen as erotic and her dancing as pornographic, 
usually performed in front of  eager, predominantly male, audiences. As 
a result, the Indonesian Council of  Ulama (MUI) issued a fatwa haram 
(forbidden in Islam) forbidding her dancing and costume. This fatwa 
became a trigger for the local MUI chapter in Surakarta to force local 
police to ban Inul’s performances in her hometown. It also encouraged 
the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of  Mujahidin in Indonesia, MMI) 
in Yogyakarta, to protest Inul’s appearance on the television show Duet 
Maut (TransTV). At the national level, the famous Dangdut singer, 
Rhoma Irama, made a public statement that Inul’s performance was not 
a part of  Dangdut music as he perceived it. Indeed, he asserted that her 
performance was degrading to Islam. These public statements about 
Inul were the starting point for a national debate on religious authority, 
freedom of  expression, women’s rights, and a redefinition of  the notion of  
Muslim piety among politicians, religious leaders, feminists, intellectuals, 
celebrities, fans and ordinary people in the popular print media.4 
Though it did not have quite same impact on Indonesian audiences 
as Inul’s performance, the presence of  Fatin Sidqiah Lubis as the winner 
of  Indonesian X Factor (IXF) singing contest in 2013 raised questions in 
relation to her performance among conservative Muslims. The questions 
they proposed included: why did Fatin, a veiled Muslimah girl, join a singing 
contest on a public secular television program? Indeed, instead of  singing 
Islamic songs to praise both Allah and the prophet of  Muhammad, she 
danced and sung mostly western songs considered to be un-Islamic and 
3 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and 
Commodification on the Landscape of  the Indonesian Public Sphere”, Contemporary 
Islam, vol. 3, no. 3 (2009), p. 210, accessed 8 Jul 2014. 
4 Andrew N. Weintraub, “Dance Drills, Faith Spills: Islam, Body Politics, and 
Popular Music in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, Popular Music, vol. 27, no. 03 (2008), p. 9; 
Heryanto (ed.), “Pop Culture and Competing Identities”.
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inviting sexually immorality. Surely what Fatin did was not representative 
of  Islamic values and culture. Therefore, Fatin’s victory in the IXF in May 
2013 was a kind of  loss for Islam. However, many Indonesian Muslims 
supported Fatin’s performance. For them, she represented not only a 
modernist Muslimah capable of  adopting western culture by consuming 
western songs, but also represented a young Muslimah following a global 
trend without losing her identity by consistently wearing the veil as the 
symbol of  her Islamic faith. Surprisingly, when the IXF program closed 
its final session, KH A. Cholil Ridwan, the chairman of  the MUI Centre 
for Cultural Arts, supported Fatin’s performance through an open letter 
in the national media, Republika, representing the voice of  Islam in order 
that she win the contest. He also invited the Muslim majority to support 
her by voting via short message service (SMS). 
Both these examples illustrate how Islam in Indonesia is not 
merely concerned with violence, terrorism, and the ‘conservative turn’ 
which is developing within Indonesian mass Muslim groups especially in 
relation to Islamic studies discourses. Islamic popular culture is a subject 
of  study that needs to be explored deeply in order to understand the 
current perceptions and practices of  Muslims in the midst of  a global 
capitalist culture that is interconnected with local cultures. Within this 
context, this paper intends to look at the victory of  Fatin Shidqia in the 
IXF competition and the responses of  Indonesian Muslims to new forms 
of  Islamic popular culture in Indonesia by answering the following the 
questions: what is the face of  current Indonesian Muslim in the post-
Suharto period? Why did KH. A. Cholil Ridwan (Chairman of  the MUI 
Centre for Cultural Arts) support Fatin as a contestant in the IXF? Was 
such support a sign of  a new perspective to how to view a Muslim woman 
who sings western songs on a public reality show such as IXF as part 
of  a global popular culture, or was it merely a sentimental moment in 
which a Muslimah girl sung on a secular TV show? What is the impact of  
Fatin as the first veiled Indonesian Muslimah to win the IXF on Islamic 
popular culture in Indonesia? 
This paper argues that the presence of  Islamic popular culture in 
Indonesia – magazines, books, novels, films, as well as fashion shows 
Indonesian Islam and Indonesian Muslims as compatible not only with 
democracy but as active in the localization of  global popular culture. In 
addition, it looks at Fatin as an icon for young Indonesian Muslims who 
connect globally whenever they consume, and which leads to the creation 
of  their hybrid identities as both Indonesian Muslims and global citizens
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B. Islamic Popular Culture in Indonesia
Dressed in school uniform, and wearing a white veil and a name 
tag with the audition number 11218, Fatin shyly came into the audition 
room having obtained a permit from school to attend. She looked 
innocent and awkward. Watching her performance, many IXF judges 
(famous musicians and singers, such as Beby Romeo, Ahmad Dani, 
Rossa, and Mulan Jameela) looked at her as though she was any other 
person auditioning, perhaps without any special talent. Both Beby 
Romeo and Ahmad Dani underestimated her abilities. Before she started 
singing, Dani in his usual style, asked a sarcastic question regarding 
Fatin’s muslim clothes, jokingly asking, ‘could you please explain the 
meaning of  Grenade in Arabic?’ The judges were very surprised when 
she started singing Grenade with an amazing voice, and began to follow 
her performance closely. After she finished, the judges praised her voice, 
particularly Dani who said, “I really like your voice”. Indeed, Dani said 
openly that her voice similar to that of  Cyndi Lauper who sung Time after 
Time. Surprisingly, the compliments did not stop there – she became the 
center of  debate among the judges (Dani and Rosa) who wanted to ask 
her to be their student in the coming IXF. Fatin’s audition performance 
became very popular for not only Indonesian audiences but also for 
netizens. At the time of  writing this paper, there were 5.409.33 people 
who had viewed her audition video on Youtube. It then had attracted 
international singer, Bruno Mars, who put her video up on his website. 
Fatin Sidqiah, a young-urban girl from Jakarta quickly became a new Idol 
for many young Indonesian Muslims. 
Fatin is not the first veiled Muslim girl to have entered a public 
singing contest. Previously, Malay singer, Shila Hamzah, won Asian Wave 
in Shanghai, China. She sang in Mandarin without fully understanding the 
lyrics, and defeated famous boy bands from East Asia such as Teen Top, 
Zea, and Cross Gene.5 Surely these moments seem difficult to believe 
when we consider them in the context of  the ways in which many Muslim 
countries in the world categorize both music and singing in relation to 
5 “Malay Singer Shila Wins China Competition Singing Mandarin While Sticking 
to Her Religious Belief ”, The Real Singapore (10 Jun 2013), http://therealsingapore.com/
content/malay-singer-shila-wins-china-competition-singing-mandarin-while-sticking-
her-religious, accessed 5 Nov 2014.
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the discourse on Islamic law. As cited by Barendregt6 and Nieuwkerk,7 
there at least are three categories in accordance with Islamic law on both 
music and singing, mainly “the commendable recitation of  al-Quran; 
the singing of  work or wedding songs which is neither discouraged nor 
encouraged (makrūh); and sensuous music that is performed in association 
with condemned activities or that is thought to incite such prohibited 
practices as consumption of  drugs and alcohol, lust, and prostitution”. 
In addition, regarding reasons why women are prohibited from singing 
in public, it is not only related to the interpretation of  Islamic law by 
‘conservative Islamic groups’ in which the female voice is perceived 
as part of  the aurāt (parts of  the body that must be concealed), but it 
is also thought that “the position women as the weaker sex in need of  
protection from male desire”.8 However, I realize that comparing both 
Malaysia and Indonesia with other majority Muslim countries regarding 
the possibility of  women singing in the public sphere is not only about 
exploring the government, it’s institutional interpretations, and Islamic 
institutional apparatuses from the level of  the Quran and sunah, but also 
about understanding relations of  power in both structure and agency 
which dominate and which are contested in order to shape society.          
During the New Order regime and after the downfall of  Suharto, 
the emergence of  Fatin Sidqiah in the Indonesian public sphere was 
not sudden, though her presence brought novelty to strengthen Islamic 
popular culture in Indonesia at the time. As is well known, the seeds of  
Islamic popular culture had emerged in the increasing Islamic symbolism 
and its public expression during the New Order Regime, especially in 
1990s while the Suharto presidency pretended to be an Islamic regime 
(1990-1998), implementing an Islamisation strategy by focusing on ‘the 
accentuation of  Islamic symbols in public discourse and accommodating 
6 Michael Buehler, “Elite Competition and Changing State-Society Relations: 
Shari’a Policymaking in Indonesia”, in Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary 
Indonesian Politics, ed. by Michele Ford and Tom Pepinsky (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, 2014), pp. 157–75, http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18932/, 
accessed 8 Jul 2015. 
7 Karin Van Nieuwkerk, “An Hour for God and An Hour for the Heart: Islam, 
Gender and Female Entertainment in Egypt”, Umbc.edu (13 Jun 1998), http://www.
umbc.edu/eol/MA/ma_stg/altri/karin1.htm, accessed 14 Oct 2014. 
8 Bart Barendreg, “The Art of  No-Seduction: Muslim Boy-Band Music in 
Southeast Asia and The Fear of  The Female Voice”, IIAS Newslette (2006), http://www.
iias.nl/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL40_10.pdf, accessed 14 Oct 2014. 
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religious socio-political powers’.9 The main reason Suharto engaged this 
strategy was due to the military’s disappointed partly who were backing 
him, because his family member’s corruption asked to greater share 
of  pie. Using this strategy was a rational choice to rebalance his power 
significantly changed the position of  Indonesian Muslims from ‘object 
as enemy’ to be ‘subject as friend, from a peripheral to a central position 
within the government. One of  ways Suharto  approached Indonesian 
Muslims was to present as a pious Muslim. He went on pilgrimage to 
Mecca with his family and when he returned to Jakarta he added the name 
“Muhammad” as his first name, he became Muhammad Suharto. His first 
daughter, Tutut started to wear a veil (kerudung) while attending public 
events. Other programs supporting Islam then followed, such as the 
establishment of  the first of  Islamic bank in Indonesia, Muamalat, and 
the establishment of  the Association of  Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
(Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI).10 
In this context, fashionable Muslim clothing boutiques were 
established by prominent fashion designers, such as Alphiana 
Chandrajani, Ida Royani and Anne Rufaidah. These attracted Indonesian 
celebrities to wear the veil. Due to this momentum, institutions such as 
Paramadina Eksekutif, Tazkiya Sejati, IIMAN (Indonesian Islamic Media 
Network) and ICNIS (Intensive Course and Networking for Islamic 
Science) were established to encourage upper class Indonesian Muslims 
to study Islam.11 Islamic public sermons became a new activity for most 
Indonesian Muslims in many places in tandem with the emergence of  
popular preachers; one of  those popular preachers was Zainuddin MZ. 
As well, there were Islamic music events such as Kantata Takwa and 
singers such as Rhoma Irama. The number of  Islamic books jumped in 
the big cities of  Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta, while they indirectly 
strengthened Islamic public discourse in 1990s.12 Capturing this image 
of  Suharto’s support of  Islam, Robert Hefner13 as cited by Burhani has 
9 Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam”, p. 235. 
10 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 128. 
11 Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam”, pp. 229–50. 
12 Najib Kailani, “Forum Lingkar Pena and Muslim Youth in Contemporary 
Indonesia”, informit.com (2012), http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn
=984332214396280;res=IELAPA, accessed 23 Dec 2014. 
13 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 128; Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The 
Reformasi ’98 and the Arab Spring: A Comparative Study of  Popular Uprisings in 
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described it properly as a man who “shattered in one fell swoop one of  
the most enduring stereotypes of  New Order politics. Here, after all, was 
a man long regarded as a staunch defender of  Javanese mysticism and 
Pancasila pluralism giving his blessing to an elite Muslim organization 
openly dedicated to the Islamization of  Indonesian society”.
In the post-authoritarian period, this Islamic identity and its 
symbols are practiced more explicitly in the Indonesian public sphere. 
This indicates three factors – the emergence of  conservative Islamic 
groups such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI); new regulations focused on Islamic Law through Perda 
Syariah in some Indonesian provinces from 2000-2009;14 the appearance 
of  Islamic popular culture (movies, religious soap operas/sinetron religi, 
books, magazines, music, and Islamic public sermons both on television 
and on the internet) that shape the Indonesian public sphere.15 Hasan 
tends to explain those conditions as being New Order legacies.16 However, 
I argue that is not an adequate argument through which to understand 
the phenomenon of  the explosion in Islamic popular cultural forms and 
their popularity. The transformation of  the governmental structure in 
the transition from the New Order regime to the Reformasi era could be 
an alternative explanation for two possible reasons. First, the downfall 
of  the Suharto presidency created a power vacuum that provided the 
opportunity for members of  society to propose their own ideology. 
Hence, Indonesia in the post-New Order period became the arena for 
Indonesia and Tunisia”, Asian Politics & Policy, vol. 6, no. 2 (2014), p. 212.
14 Michael Buehler, “Elite Competition. 
15 Widodo Amrih, “Writing for God: Piety and Consumption in Popular 
Islam. Inside Indonesia 93”, INS Insideindonesia (2008), http://www.insideindonesia.
org/writing-for-god, accessed 10 Oct 2014; Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam”, 
pp. 129–50; Rianne Subijanto and E. Ardevol A. Roig, “Producting TV Series: The 
Making of  Popular Piety Culture in Indonesia”, in Researching Media Through Practices: 
An Ethnographic Approach (Digithum: UOC, 2009), pp. 32–7; Hariyadi, “Islamic Popular 
Culture and the New Identity of  Indonesian Muslim Youth”, presented at the 18th 
Biennial Conference of  the Asian Studies Association of  Australia (Adelaide, 6/07 2010), 
http://asaa.asn.au/ASAA2010/reviewed_papers/Hariyadi.pdf, accessed 23 Aug 2014; 
Ariel Heryanto (ed.), Popular Culture in Indonesia: Fluid Identities in Post-Authoritarian Politics 
(London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008) ; Wahyudi Akmaliah Muhammad 
and Khelmy K. Pribadi, “Anak Muda, Radikalisme, Dan Budaya Populer”, MAARIF 
Institute for Culture and Humanity, vol. 8, no. 1 (2013), pp. 132–53; Inaya Rakhmani, 
“Mainstream Islam: Television Industry Practice and Trends in Indonesian Sinetron”, 
Asian Journal of  Social Science, vol. 42, no. 3-4 (2014), pp. 435–66.
16 Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam”, p. 236. 
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an ideological battle in the struggle for power to determine who will 
dominate. ‘Islamisation’ is one of  the dominant ideologies, inclusive of  
Islamic popular culture in its various forms.17 This situation, therefore, 
provided a space for freedom of  expression. It created an opportunity 
for new groups, mostly those that were repressed under the New Order 
regime, to express their political aspirations and strengthen their religious 
identities, thereby exposing the weaknesses of  the government’s political 
will in upholding justice and equality during the transition. Second, 
decentralization in Indonesia has had both a positive and negative 
impact. On the level of  the positive, regional autonomy (otonomi daerah) 
allows for the possibility of  social justice and regional prosperity. On 
the negative side, however, the new smaller provinces and regions have 
been encouraged to act corruptly and have in many cases to increased 
their level of  authority over religious expression by discriminating against 
those societal groups perceived as other.18 
C. The Headscarf  and its Impact in Popular Reality Television
Like other popular talent reality programs such as RCTI’s Indonesian 
idol, Indosiar’s Fantasy Academy (AFI), TPI’s Kontes Dangdut Indonesia 
(KDI), and TransTV’s Indonesia Mencari Bakat, Indonesia X Factor (IXF) 
is one of  the most popular programs, adopted from global X Factor 
and adapted to suit Indonesian audiences. The IXF is sponsored by the 
Fremantle Media and RCTI. It is originally based in the United Kingdom 
where it replaced Pop Idol. As a television music competition, the X Factor, 
created by Simon Cowell, has franchises 42 countries, while there are 
2-4 for countries that are joining within one program of  TV channel.19 
However, unlike previous talent reality shows where judges review, 
evaluate and criticize each contestant’s performance, in the X Factor 
judges act as mentors for the contestants in their particular category. The 
mentor does not only aid his or her students to select songs but they also 
17 Ariel Heryanto, Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of  Indonesian Screen Culture 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2014), p. 208. 
18 Hairus Salim H. S, Najib Kailani, and Nikmal Azekiyah, Politik Ruang Publik 
Sekolah: Negosiasi dan Resistensi di Sekolah Menengah Umum Negeri di Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta: 
Center for Religion & Cross Cultural Studies, 2011), p. 10, http://www.youthnation.
or.id/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ICR.2011.PluralismeSMUN-Jogja.pdf, accessed 
15 Aug 2014. 
19 Penelope Coutas, “Fame, Fortune, Fantasi: Indonesian Idol and the New 
Celebrity”, Asian Journal of  Communication, vol. 16, no. 4 (2006), pp. 371–92, accessed 
8 Jul 2014. 
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judge contestants of  other categories. A democratic system is applied in 
which votes are cast by the audience via short message service (SMS).
Though the IXF is not something new for Indonesian audiences, 
it is quite different from other popular reality programs in Indonesia. 
The appearance of  a veiled young girl, Fatin Shidqia Lubis, her amazing 
voice, fashionable Muslim clothes, and articulate English singing, caught 
the attention of  not only Indonesian audiences but also the Indonesian 
vocalist Anggun, an IXF judge, who praised Fatin for her beautiful voice 
and beautiful headscarf. Anggun’s comments on Fatin’s performance of  
Rihanna’s song Diamond were as follows.  
“Fatin you’ve got it all. You are beautiful with an amazing voice. Indeed, 
your voice is very unique. You have natural talent. By the way, how old 
are you? You’re 16, am I right? Have you ever taken a vocal course for 
singing? You’re really annoying. Even though you haven’t had any training 
your voice is so good. There’s one more thing – the ecxcentric way you 
wear your the veil, is really very intriguing to me. You have shown that 
the jilbab can be both modist and fashionable, which is great!”.20
The power of  Anggun’s comments, as an Indonesian and French-
naturalized singer-songwriter who has an international reputation, 
withwere surely powerful in promoting Fatin Shidqia as the veiled girl 
with the beautiful voice. At the time of  the contest, two French journalists 
came to Jakarta to document Anggun’s daily life for 48 hours. While 
covering Anggun’s role as one of  the judges, they were very surprised 
to see one of  the contestants in a veil. As Anggun expressed to Fatin 
after she had sung Rihanna’s Stay inat the final of  XFI on May 17, 2013: 
“Last week, two French journalists came to cover my activities over a 48 
hours period in Indonesia. And they came to X Factor and saw you singing. 
To them you are a most unique figure. Besides your unique voice, they 
were surprised that you wearre a veil. I told them it is something allowed/
legitimated in Indonesia. However, they thought that it was really cool 
that for you to have this style and such a voice, and yet arebe so young, 
I hope you stay this way after X Factor. All of  these qualities are your 
20 “Fatin kamu itu kelebihannya banyak banget. Kamu cantik dan suaranya 
bagus. Suaranya juga punya identitas. Kamu juga kayak punya natural bakat. Kamu 
umur berapa sih? 16 tahun yah? Dulu kamu pernah latihan vocal yah? Kan nyebelin 
banget, belum latihan aja udah kayak begini. Udah gitu satu lagi, dengan kelebihan 
kamu berjilbab buat aku itu justru jauh sangat menarik. Karena kita bisa buktiin. Kamu 
buktiin dengan berjilbab bisa modist bisa fashionable itu bagus sekali.”
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strengths, so please don’t change”.21
Anggun’s two comments above assert that Fatin’s strengths lie in 
her appearance and her husky voice. These unique characteristics certainly 
differentiated her from other contestants. Unsurprisingly, George 
Levendis, record executive and current International Head of  Syco TV, 
and international judge for the X Factor, praised her performance as 
the one “making an impact on the XF Indonesia” on both twitter and 
facebook especially while she was singing Rihanna’s Diamond, on February 
15, 2013. her Fatin indirectly became the symbol for the IXF to increase 
RCTI’s ratings nationally. Although the IXF always runs at night for 60- 
240 minutes, from 21.00 PM, its rating was often highest during the day 
to day in average about 45-40 %. Meanwhile, shares for the IXF steeply 
grew from 15, 6- 28, 3 %. Hence, keeping Fatin in the program seemed 
a rational choice for RCTI. 
There are two reasons for Fatin’s impact in the IXF. First, there 
was impunity for Fatin from her mistakes although she forgot the lyrics 
while singing four times.22 Forgetting lyrics in singing competitions is 
usually considered a big mistake. Not only does the singer feel ashamed 
but the audience tends to punish them by not voting for them. Secondly, 
there were no comments from the judges criticizing Fatin’s forgetfulness 
during the final session. They knew Fatin had an amazing voice but during 
the competition her technical skills, especially her ability to manage her 
speed and control of  her voice did not grow vastly like other contestants. 
However, as explained, the strength of  Fatin’s performance was in her 
headscarf, symbolic of  her Muslim identity, and which was capitalized 
on in order to commercialize her identity on television to attract athe 
21 “Minggu lalu aku didatangi oleh dua wartawan dari Prancis yang dia meliput aku 
selama 48 jam di Indonesia. Dan mereka meliput X Factor dan melihat kamu menyanyi. Dan 
kamu adalah salah satu sosok yang unik yang enggak ada sebenarnya di luar. Dari suara kamu 
yang khas, tapi penampilan kamu, mereka agak kaget melihat penyanyi berjilbab. Aku bilang ini 
sesuatu yang sah di Indonesia dan banyak di negara. Tapi buat mereka itu melihat orang berjilbab 
itu bernyanyi itu keren banget. Dan kamu masih muda dengan gaya kamu bernyanyi dengan gaya 
kamu seperti ini. Ini dipertahankan ya setelah X Factor juga. Karena ini menjadi kekuatan kamu. 
Tetap menjadi seperti ini”. 
22 Darmansyah, “Empat Kali Sudah, Fatin Lupa Lirik Saat Perform”, nuga.co (5 
Nov 2013), http://www.nuga.co/nuga-forum/empat-kali-sudah-fatin-lupa-lirik-saat-
perform.html, accessed 11 May 2014; Examples include: at the bootcamp, January 25, 
2013 while singing Rindu; at bootcamp, on february 1, 2013 while performing Pumped 
Up Kicks; at the Gala Show, March 8, 2013 during Girl on Fire; and at the Gala Show, May 
11, 2013 during Everything at Once.
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Muslim audience. 
D. MUI Support for Fatin Shidqia
As explained earlier, Fatin’s appearance as a veiled young woman 
on IXF attracted  the attention of  Indonesians, especially Muslims, 
attention to r, People of  all ages and ofincluding KH A. Cholil Ridwan, 
chairman of  the MUI centre for Cultural Arts and former Chairman of  
the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia/DDII). Fatin’s fans adopted the name the Fatinistic community, 
from the acronym of  Fatin Idol Saving the Incredible Characteristic. Instead of  
only backing Fatin by SMS, they also sent support through twitter and 
facebook, becoming her supporters online, while she also attracted were 
also her “haters” who who disliked both edher voice and appearance. 
Cholil Ridwan wrote a public statement in the reader letter section of  
the Republika daily national newspaper to support Fatin and inviting all 
Indonesians to send their short messages on April 9, 2013, one month 
before the final IXF. Unlike both Kompas and Tempo Magazine that tend 
towards nationalist ideology thereby targeting Indonesians generally, 
Republika is focused on Islamic values and its audience is drawn mostly 
from Indonesian Muslims. Cholil Ridwan states below:
Assalaamualaikum. Men, watch Fatin’s performance on the “X Factor”. 
Men and families are proud of  you in your  arecommittmented 
to wearing the veil during your performance in the “X Factor”. 
As the chairman of  the MUI’s Center for Cultural Arts, I have a 
message for Fatin.23  
 There will come a time when you will have to chooseechoice,
 either the jilbab or a career. For instance, someone will whisper
23 Bapak sering menonton penampilan Fatin di X Factor. Bapak dan keluarga bangga 
dengan kamu yang tetap berjilbab dalam penampilanmu ikutan di X Factor. Bapak sebagai ketua 
MUI Pusat yang membidangi seni dan budaya ingin berpesan untuk Fatin. Satu, pada suatu saat 
Fatin akan dihadapkan pilihan jilbab atau karier. Misalnya, akan ada yang membisikkan Fatin 
dengan kalimat, “Kalau mau menang, jadi juara I, kamu harus copot jilbab” atau “Kalau mau 
ikut menyanyi di luar negeri, kamu harus copot jilbab”. Bapak pesan jangan sekali-kali kamu jual 
akidahmu demi karier duniawimu. Dan, jauhi pergaulan negatif. Dua, jangan tinggalkan salat 
lima waktu dengan alasan apa pun. Kalau terpaksa, boleh di akhir waktu. Dan, kalau betul-betul 
darurat, bisa dijamak. Tiga, kepada umat Islam, khususnya muslimah yang sudah berjilbab dan 
anggota Hijabers, setiap Fatin mau tampil di X Factor, dukunglah dan niatkan untuk dakwah dan 
syiar jilbab. Empat, rumus jilbab itu 3T (tidak buka aurat, tidak transparan, dan tidak ketat).
Terima kasih atas perhatian Fatin dan salam buat kedua orang tuamu. 
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 to Fatin, “If  you win, and take first prize, you must take off  your
 headscarf ”. I suggest that you do not sell your belief  for your
 .career, and avoid negative social interactions
 Do not stop performing your daily prayers for any reason. If  you are in 
pinch, you can pray later. If  you are in the midst of  an emergency, you 
can pray by merging the prayers into one. 
For all Indonesian Muslims, especially Muslimah who wear the veil and 
members of  Hijabers (veiled Muslim women), when Fatin is on stage on 
the “X Factor”, please do support and plan for religious proselytizing on 
the magnificence of  the jilbab.       
There are three formula (rumus) for veiling, the 3T: Tidak Membuka 
Aurat, Tidak Transparant, Tidak Ketat (Doesn’t expose the aurat, Not 
transparent,  Not tight).
Thank you for attention Fatin and send my regards to your parents. 
Wassalam.
KH. A. Cholil Ridwan, the chairman of  the MUI Centre for Cultural Arts
This public statement had a big impact on the Indonesian public, 
andCholil Ridwan’s statement was reproduced in the media. This led to 
two kinds of  public response; those who agreed and those who disagreed. 
For those who agreed, this was a form of  support for Islam and the 
progress of  Indonesia, and an example of  how Indonesian values and 
culture can connect with global “western culture” without any “class 
of  their civilization”. Fatin’s performance also showed that Indonesian 
Muslims can practice Islam in their unique way and in which there is 
dialogue between Islamic texts (Quran), Hadiths and cultural modernity.24 
On the other hand, for more literalist, conservative Muslim’s, Fatin’s 
performance was not in accordance with the source of  both the Quran 
and Sunnah in which women are not permitted to perform in public, as 
her voice and appearance may provoke male desire.25 In addition, the 
24 M. Bambang Pranowo, “Fatin Dan X-Islam Factor”, Okezone.com (27 May 
2013), http://celebrity.okezone.com/read/2013/05/27/386/813133/fatin-dan-x-
islam-factor, accessed 14 Oct 2013; M. Husnan Ulinnuha, “Fatin Dan Gaya Baru Islam 
Indonesia”, nu.or.id (30 May 2013), http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-
ids,4-id,44785-lang,id-c,kolom-t,Fatin+dan+Gaya+Baru+Islam+Indonesia-.phpx, 
accessed 10 Oct 2014.
25 Ageung Reza, “Fenomena Fatin Shidqia Dan Gejala Kompromi Fikih”, 
Hidayatullah.com (11 Apr 2014), http://www.hidayatullah.com/artikel/ghazwul-fikr/
read/2013/04/11/2514/fenomena-fatin-shidqia-dan-gejala-kompromi-fikih.html, 
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IXF was considered a product of  capitalism, created by Jewish people 
to mobilize young Muslims away from their Islamic daily life and bring 
them closer to cultural hedonism and its entertainment.26 
These conflicting viewpoints raise several questions. What led 
Cholil Ridwan to support Fatin’s performance? Is there any relation 
between the change in the MUI and its members’ perspective on Islam and 
its social realities, especially in the case of  a Muslimah (female Muslim) 
singer who performs in public? These questions are historically based 
on two facts from previous MUI policies. First, as I described at the 
beginning of  this paper, the MUI had issued the haram fatwa (declaring 
something as forbidden in Islam) in regards to Inul’s performance, 
especially her drill dance as it was perceived to inspire erotic fashion 
and was claimed to have involved pornographic action (in front of  a 
predominantly male audience) in 2003. Second, the MUI’s conservative 
fatwa caused conflict by excluding Indonesian Muslim groups such as 
Syiah and Ahmadiyah from the milieu of  Indonesian Islam as their 
schools of  thought were perceived as deviating from Islam. The MUI, 
represented by Cholil Ridwan, had a different perspective, however, in 
which they were more moderate and inclusive in supporting a veiled 
Muslim girl in her performance in IXF, despite that her choice of  song 
and the context of  the program are seen as a representation of  western 
culture and part of  more secular life style. Indeed the perception of  
Muslim youth has shifted and changed over the decades. In the mid-
1980s they were often represented as economically poor and conservative 
in outlook, while nowadays they are associated with ‘wealth, icons of  
modernity, urban lifestyle, or popular culture’.27 
In regard to the second fact, Cholil’s reason for supporting Fatin 
can seemingly explain it. For him, although he does not like music or 
watching television, did not know who Fatin was, or anything about the 
X Factor program and its origins, on seeing a veiled girl with her ‘syariah 
culture’ (budaya syariah) competing in a non-syariah (not in accordance 
accessed 13 Oct 2014; Furhther, because the event was held in on a public stage, the 
coming together of  men and women in one place could not be avoided. In fact, in 
Islam there what is known as a border of  mahram, where those who were not related 
by blood or are not married are prohibited to perform khalwat.
26 “Klarifikasi Kyai Cholil Atas Dukungannya Kepada Fatin X Factor”, 
VOA-ISLAM.COM  (29 May 2013),  http://www.voa-is lam.com/read/
indonesiana/2013/05/29/24889/klarifikasi-kyai-cholil-atas-dukungannya-kepada-
fatin-x-factor/, accessed 12 Oct 2014.
27 Heryanto, Identity and Pleasure. 
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with Islamic law) forum consumed by a large number of  Indonesians, 
he felt compelled to support her. In addition, her wearing of  the jilbab 
in the contest was not a barrier to her success. Clearly, he saw Fatin as 
an inspiration and role model for female Muslim youth who want to 
work and achieve their career goals without feeling they have to abandon 
wearing the marker of  their Islamic identity, the jilbab. At a glance, 
his perspective as MUI representative is moderate. My assumption is 
strengthened by Cholil’s opinion when interviewed by Kapanlagi.com28 
that confirmed his support. He did not only like Fatin’s performance 
and the fact that she wore the veil, but also her singing of  the Western, 
English language songs. Nevertheless, his views remain conservative. 
Indeed, the reason behind his support for Fatin was the fact that one of  
her competitor’s in the IXF final, Novita Dewi, a Christian, wore sexy 
clothes and a necklace bearing a cross. Support for Fatin’s performance 
was therefore intended to defeat the unbeliever culture (budaya kafir) and 
to advance the use of  the jilbab in accordance with Islamic law.29
On seeing the final of  IXF, Cholil referred to it as ‘an issue of  
Christian missionization (kristenisasi)’, where it is the site of  collective 
memory for Indonesian Muslims whom they reproduce and propagate 
in many events in order to shape both stigma and stereotype while 
they perceive Indonesian Christian people, particularly in establishing a 
relation between Islam and Christianity. Although it is difficult to clarify 
the issue of  kristenisasi, the emergence of  this issue could be awakening 
a primordial sentiment among them. An effort to establish it could be 
seen by the emergence of  a short message on the BBM (Blackberry 
Messenger) network during IXF’s final. The content of  the BBM appealed 
for Muslims to choose Fatin as a Muslim rather than Novita as a Christian. 
Indeed, the final of  IXF was not only a competition between Fatin and 
Novita but also between Islam and Christianity. Due to the extensive 
use of  BBM as a form of  social media, and the ease with which people 
connect and share information within their own personal networks, it 
is possible that the role of  communications via BBM social media may 
have influenced the high number of  votes for Fatin. 
28 “Surat Ketua MUI Untuk Fatin Merupakan Dukungan Pribadi”, Kapanlagi.
com (3 Apr 2013), http://musik.kapanlagi.com/berita/surat-ketua-mui-untuk-fatin-
merupakan-dukungan-pribadi-a8b49a.html, accessed 4 Mar 2014.
29 “Klarifikasi Kyai Cholil; A.Z. Muttaqin, “Dukungan Semu Ketua MUI Untuk 
Fatin”, Arrahmah.com (31 May 2013), http://www.arrahmah.com/news/2013/05/31/
dukungan-semu-ketua-mui-untuk-fatin.html, accessed 6 Nov 2014.
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Friends! In just minutes, the Grand Final of  Indonesian X Factor will begin! And so 
will the war between Islam and Christianity, Fatin Shidqia and Novita Dewi. So if  
you are Muslim! Vote/support Fatin! A very devoted veiled girl! And very charming! 
Her voice is also beautiful. Support/voting for Novita means that you are supporting 
Christianity! #SBC (Sorry for Broadcast) Sorry non-Muslims.30 
So how did Fatin respond to support from the MUI, one of  the 
biggest Indonesian Muslim organisations? Did she welcome it warmly and 
perceive it as normal, like the support she received from other people? 
Unlike people who have studied in Islamic schools such as madrasah 
and pesantren who have firm roots in traditional Islam, or those who are 
studying Islam directly under a religious teacher such as an ulama, kyai, 
habib, or ustadz, and taking courses and attending Islamic gatherings 
routinely in mosque, classes, and offices, Fatin is one of  the new Muslim 
generation who are connected to the virtual world and global consumer 
culture. Growing up in the capital city of  Jakarta, and living in urban 
South Jakarta, has strengthened her identity as a new Indonesian Muslim 
hybrid youth. Indeed, due to her abundant resources she has had many 
life experiences, yet her references to Islamic religious teacher/leader 
are without strong traditional roots.31 There are, however, two figures 
of  moral and religious authority in her life, her teachers and her parents, 
especially her mother who taught her Islamic values. Therefore, although 
many people perceived that the MUI’s support for her performance was 
a way of  legitimizing the representation of  Indonesian Muslim’s, for 
Fatin, MUI support was no different from the support she was given 
from other famous figures and celebrities. As Fatin explained,  
“I’ve heard about it, and am very happy. Because I am happy, I pray 
to Allah asking him  for ongoing support…Since the beginning I have 
worn the jilbab, so it is part of  my identity as veiled girl. Therefore, it is 
seemingly impossible to not wear one.32 
30 Kawan-Kawan! nanti Grand Final X - Factor  Indonesia Loh! Perang Agama 
Juga Islam vs Kristen, Fatin Shidqia vs Novita Dewi! bagi yang muslim! ayo dukung 
Fatin! cewek berkerudung yang muslimah sekali! dan juga menarik hati! suaranya pun 
bagus! dukung novita! berarti anda mendukung kristian! #sbc sori nonmuslim; Andri 
M. Kusumawardhana, “X-Factor Indonesia, Dan Fans Yang Rasialis”, Kompasaiana.com 
(7 Jun 2013), http://hiburan.kompasiana.com/televisi/2013/06/07/x-factor-indonesia-
dan-fans-yang-rasialis-566668.html, accessed 11 May 2014.
31  Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-Esai Agama, Budaya, dan Politik dalam 
Bingkai Strukturalisme Transendental (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), pp. 33–9.
32 Nanda Hadiyanti, “Didukung MUI, Ini Tanggapan Fatin Shidqia”, Tempo.co 
(6 Apr 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/04/06/112471562/Didukung-
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“I have been immune from its disturbance, temptation, and trial”33
E. Concluding Remarks 
Many Indonesian audience members and judges were surprised 
when Fatin won IXF due to the lesser quality of  her voice and technical 
vocal skills compared to Novita Dewi’s performance on May 25, 2013. 
Because it was a ‘fair game’ and the winner was the contestant with 
the highest vote, they eventually accepted it. Moreover, the program 
name, “X Factor”, means that the judges and audiences are looking for 
the unknown factor that distinguishes one contestant from the rest. 
However, the most important point is that Fatin’s victory has strengthened 
Islamic popular culture that shapes Indonesian Muslim identity in the 
post-Suharto period. Indeed, she has filled the vacuum in public figures 
representing Indonesian Muslim youth, because many Islamic popular 
culture products especially Islamic movies merely encourage youth to be 
pious Muslims in specific situations. Therefore, in the Islamic popular 
culture that has emerged, such as women’s clothing, consumerism, print 
media, literature, social media, film, music, and television, Fatin represents 
a role model for Indonesian Muslim youth. She is a young Indonesian 
woman secure in her identity as a Muslim, capable of  inspiring other 
young Indonesian Muslims to imagine how to be a Muslim woman who 
is pious, fashionable, modernist, and a consumer of  western songs and 
capitalist products.
Fatin’s position as a figure of  Islamic popular culture, as well as 
an icon for Indonesian Muslim youth can be demonstrated in three 
factors. First, she was supported by a large percentage of  Indonesian 
Muslims to win IXF. Even KH A Cholil from the MUI, considered a 
conservative Islamic group, made a public statement inviting Indonesian 
Muslims to vote for her. Second, the way Fatin’s styled (hijab ala Fatin) 
her headscarf  become a trend, especially among young adult Muslims 
aged 12-30 years. Previously, headscarf  styles were dominated by famous 
Indonesian public figures who do not wear the veil in their daily lives, 
such as Sahrini, Asanti, and Rosa. Third, Fatin was on the cover of  Hai 
MUI-Ini-Tanggapan-Fatin-Shidqi, accessed 6 Nov 2014. 
33 “Sudah tahan gangguan, godaan dan cobaan, insya Allah”; Sobri, “Fatin 
Shidqia X Factor Indonesia Tahan Gangguan, Godaan Dan Cobaan”, Hai Online 
(2 Apr 2013), http://www.hai-online.com/Hai2013/Entertainment/Music/News/
Fatin-Shidqia-X-Factor-Indonesia-Tahan-Gangguan-Godaan-dan-Cobaan/, accessed 
13 Nov 2014.
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magazine, that caters predominantly to adolescent males 17-30 years of  
age.34 According to Hai’s Editor-in-Chief, Dani Satrio, it was the first 
time in Hai history that there was a girl in a veil on Hai’s cover Hai, 2013. 
Hai’s content contains everything from music, film, education, places to 
go, fashion, technology, sport and sex education. Due to high number 
of  references to ‘Western culture’ in the content, the magazine has been 
stereotyped for years in some more conservative Islamic communities 
as the magazine that invites the destruction of  Islam (Hancurkan Agama 
Islam- HAI) in accordance with its acronym (The Indonesian word hai 
means hi or hello in everyday Indonesian). The presence of  Fatin on the 
cover then could be interpreted as a form of  transforming the stereotype 
or image of  Hai as secular magazine to that of  a secular magazine that 
is Muslim friendly.
As the winner, Fatin became not only an icon for young Muslims 
but also an inspiration for Indonesian youth in general. Following her 
victory, companies including those producing the products Pantene and 
Indosat IM3, asked her to model in advertisements. One business/brand 
most appropriate to her Islamic identity was Rabanni Ambassador, one of  
the few large boutiques selling fashionable Muslim clothes in Indonesia, 
and producing Muslim clothing with the tagline Profesor Kerudung Indonesia 
(Indonesian Headscarf  Professor). Due to Fatin’s involvement, sales of  
their products, particularly items for young muslimah girls, have increased 
significantly and Rabbani’s profits rocketted by around Rp. 500.000.000 
(approximately AUD $50000) in 2013.35 In addition, Fatin sung two songs 
on the soundtrack to the movie, 99 Cahaya di Langit Eropa which based 
on Hanum Rais’s novel depicting an Indonesian Muslim’s experience 
in Europe. Fatin was chosen to sing on the soundtrack as a marketing 
strategy to attract the Indonesian Muslim audience and provide ongoing 
example of  a modernist and fashionable girl who enjoys western songs 
while consistently maintaining her religious identity. 
In regard to the above explanation, how can we contextualize 
the phenomena of  Fatin in Islamic pop culture discourse in Indonesia? 
34 Sobri, “Fatin Shidqia Jadi Cewek Berhijab Pertama Di Cover Majalah HAI”, 
Hai Online (8 Jun 2013), http://www.hai-online.com/Hai2013/Entertainment/Music/
News/Fatin-Shidqia-Jadi-Cewek-Berhijab-Pertama-di-Cover-Majalah-HAI, accessed 
13 Nov 2014. 
35 “Fatin Ikut Dongkrak Penjualan Kerudung Rabbani Hingga Rp 
500 Miliar”, Kompas.com (20 May 2014), http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/
read/2014/05/20/1437532/artikel-detail-komentar-mobile.html, accessed 20 May 2014.
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There are two perspectives on this. First, for several scholars36 (Muzaki, 
2007; Widodo, 2008; Howell, 2008; Hariyadi, 2010; Abdul Rani, 2013; 
Barkin 2014), she is a part of  the commercialization of  Muslim life 
and commodification of  Muslim religious symbols, where Islam has 
been controlled by global capitalism as an object of  consumerism. 
Second, instead of  seeing Islam as an object of  commercialization, 
for some scholars,37 it is a wave of  Islamization in the public sphere 
in which capitalist popular culture  products are the medium through 
which to expand Islamic values and ideas of  an Islamist politic in 
Indonesia. Nonetheless, I argue that the phenomena of  Fatin can not 
be categorized within these perspectives. I prefer Heryanto’s argument38 
that it is a process of  encounter, a dialectic between ‘religious pity’ and 
‘capitalist logic respond’ which result in “the growing market for Islamic 
revitalization and life style”. Within this process of  encounter, there are 
often  contradictions in relation to Islamic values and the global culture 
which is dominated by the United States as the primary representation 
of  the West, while on the other hand, in some cases, they substantively 
converge. Therefore, reading the Fatin phenomenon as a novelty within 
the wave of  Islamic popular culture in Indonesia has to be considered 
in the context of  this tension.
36 Pattana Kitiarsa, Religious Commodifications in Asia: Marketing Gods (London: 
Routledge, 2008);  Widodo Amrih, “Writing for God; Julia Day Howell, “Modulations 
of  Active Piety: Professors and Televangelists as Promoters of  Indonesian ‘Sufisme’”, 
in Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. by Greg Fealy and Sally White 
(Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 40–62; Hariyadi, “Islamic 
Popular Culture”; Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, “Islam, Romance and Popular Taste in 
Indonesia”, Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 40, no. 116 (2012), pp. 59–73.
37 Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam”.; Kailani, “Forum Lingkar Pena and 
Muslim”.
38 Heryanto, Identity and Pleasure. 
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